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Preface 
The following report is a literature review in the India PES Project 
“Development of Integrated Tools and Consulting Services for 
Watershed Management, and Payments for Environmental Services in 
India”, supported by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA). Part I of the literature review contained here reviews seminal 
papers on payments for ecosystem services from the point of view of 
institutional, biophysical and economic feasibility of PES. Part II is a 
companion report which provides a review of organisations currently 
working in PES, as well as an evaluation of the expertise required to 
carry out rapid feasibility appraisals. Part I has been written by Nadine 
Reis and Gudmund Synnevåg Sydness and edited by David N. Barton. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Aims and Scopes of the report 
Two sub-objectives of the “India PES”1 project are to: 
 
1. Identify potential clients and demonstrate PES tools which could lead to business for the two 
partners  
2. To strengthen co-operation between NIVA and south Asian partners for joint consultancies. 
 
The project has chosen to focus on markets for watershed services. The evaluation of “business 
opportunities” for NIVA and CISED are therefore also two-fold.  Firstly, a case must be made for the 
feasibility of markets for watershed services based on theory and the study of its implementation in 
case studies in areas and for services similar to those studied in the Malabrabha River Basin. Can a 
convincing case be made for markets for watershed services based on existing experiences in India 
and South-East Asia?  What do these cases tell us about the financial, institutional and biophysical2 
limitations that must be overcome for markets for watershed services to function? Are these 
limitations common across countries, and geographical scales for the same types of watershed 
services? An evaluation of the market opportunities for payments for watershed services constitutes 
Part I of the review.  
 
If the broad pre-conditions for establishing and then sustaining markets for watershed services can be 
identified, a case may also be made for market opportunities of a second kind, involving consulting 
services in how to carry out such feasibility studies. A number of research institutes and consultancies 
in Asia have conducted case studies, often in cooperation with northern hemisphere counterparts. The 
second part of this report (Part II) constitutes an evaluation of which institutes and companies have 
been most involved in studying markets for watershed services, which agencies have and are financing 
such studies, and what are fields of expertise may be required to conduct rapid feasibility appraisals of 
the kind discussed in Part I of the report. The competencies NIVA and CISED will be able to offer in 
this regard are also being developed in the Malaprabha River Basin through land-use studies, 
hydrological modelling, economic valuation of natural versus artificial irrigation water and 
stakeholder and institutional analyses. The Part II report has been prepared before these activities have 
concluded. 
1.2 Terminology - what are payments for watershed services? 
The development of market mechanisms within Watershed Management has become increasingly 
popular in the last years as it forms the great white hope for the solution of water related conflicts and 
for the future financing of watershed protection works on a catchment level. The instrument is usually 
transcribed and promoted as ‘Payments for Watershed Services’ (PWS). ‘PWS’ can be defined as 
payments or direct compensations by the beneficiaries of a watershed service for the maintenance or 
provision of the service to the providers of the same.  However, it still often remains unclear what is 
exactly meant by this term and how, if at all, a PWS mechanism differs from community-based 
                                                     
1 Development of Tools and Methodologies to Implement the Payments for Environmental Services Concept in 
Watersheds in India, supported by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
2 Environmental constraints as well as limitations in knowledge of biophysical linkages. 
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arrangements for the management of water resources. Is it justified to refer to PWS as an alternative to 
government or community-based management? To what extent is the use of the term ‘market’ – the 
exchange of goods or services based on prices set by the laws of supply and demand – appropriate in 
the context of services provided by watersheds? The goal of this chapter is to provide answers to these 
questions in order to clarify the conceptual basics of the term ‘PWS’. 
 
The idea of PWS is based on two facts: First, in many watersheds, costs and benefits of watershed 
protection are distributed unequally among communities and/or households, because providers of a 
watershed service are not identical with the beneficiaries of the service. This can lead to a 
reinforcement of social inequalities and conflicts. For example, an upstream change to more 
sustainable land use methods often implies forgone benefits for the affected households, while it 
benefits downstream communities. Second, a growing lack of finance for sustainable water resource 
management due to decreasing investments in rural development and conservation programmes by 
governments worldwide forces project managers to look for innovative financing options (GUTMAN 
2003). 
1.2.1 Watershed services 
Hydrological processes like soil erosion, sediment transport, water flow, groundwater recharge etc. 
will become watershed services if they have socio-economic impacts. This can happen directly 
through consumption, or indirectly through the household production function or as factor inputs in 
production. (AYLWARD 1998; LELE 2006) Several watershed services are associated with upstream-
downstream linkages that imply that service providers cannot be service users and that might thus be 
provided by means of a payment mechanism between upstream communities and downstream 
beneficiaries. The most common of these watershed services are: 
 Water flow regulation (maintenance of dry season flows and flood control) 
 Erosion and sedimentation control 
 Improved water quality (nutrient load control, chemical load control, salinity control) 
 Increased water supply (surface or groundwater) 
 
The services of improved quantity/quality of waters within irrigation systems are also included under 
this perspective.  
1.2.2 Watershed services and ‘markets’ 
Whether a PWS scheme can be implemented between private sellers and buyers depends on the 
existence of a market for these services. For a good or service to be traded freely in a market, it has to 
fulfil two basic preconditions: First, it has to be exclusive, i.e. there must exist the possibility of 
excluding someone from the provision of the good/service that does not pay for it. This is essential for 
a market to emerge, because otherwise there will not be a willingness to pay. Second, it has to be 
rival: The supply of the good or service has to be limited in the way that consumption by one 
individual reduces the availability for others. If this is not given, there will be no competition for 
consumption and thus no mechanism to establish a price. Rivalry is also referred to as subtractability. 
All goods and services can be structured along their degree of excludability and rivalry; this will 
determine, whether it can be traded in a market or if a market fails to deliver payments for the 
good/service. Four types of goods and services can be distinguished, as demonstrated by means of 
forest goods and services in Table 1. 
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 Rivalry 
Excludability low high 
low Public goods, e.g. carbon sequestration 
Common pool resources, e.g. 
community woodland 
high Toll/club goods, e.g. forest park roads 
Private goods, e.g. timber and 
NTFPs 
Table 1: Excludability and rivalry of forest goods and services (source: LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002) 
The classification of different watershed services along their degree of excludability and rivalry in 
consumption will tell us, to which extent these services can be traded in a market between private 
buyers and sellers. 
Increased rainfall 
Increased rainfall is always non-excludable and non-rival, because everyone benefits without the 
benfits of others being reduced. 
Water flow regulation (maintenance of dry season flows for water supply and flood control) 
The regulation of water flow – this can be the maintenance of dry season flows and/or the prevention 
of floods – is always non-excludable, because everyone who lives downstream will automatically 
benefit from the service. At the same time it is also non-rival, because everyone is able to benefit 
whithout the benefit to other individuals being reduced.  
Erosion and sedimentation control 
The excludability of erosion and sedimentation control depends on the specific characteristics of the 
resource system and of the beneficiaries.  
The reduction of landslides can be characterised like flood control and will always be non-exclusive. 
However, a reduction of sedimentation can for example be made exclusive, if people are charged for 
the access to a lake, which maintains its recreational value this way. Sedimentation control will also be 
exclusive, if it occurs in an irrigation system, where access to the water is regulated, or if there is only 
one beneficiary (e.g. a hydropower company). But all these services are non-rival, because if they are 
once provided, everyone will benefit without reducing the benefits of others.  
Improved water quality (nutrient load control, chemical load control, salinity control) 
A similar classification like for sedimentation control applies for the service of improved water quality 
in terms of a reduced flow of nutrients, chemicals or salinity. These services are non-rival, because 
water quality will not be reduced if used by one individual. They are non-exclusive in the sense that all 
individuals that have access to the water source will benefit from improved water quality. On the other 
hand, the service can be made exclusive if it is possible to exclude individuals that do not contribute to 
the improved quality from access to the water source. 
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Increased water supply (ground and surface water) 
Ground and surface water are both typical CPRs, because they are rival, but non-exclusive in the first 
instance3. The central problem about the management of water resources, so-called ‘free-riding’, is 
closely connected to this fact: If no-one can be excluded from using a water resource, there will be no 
incentive to contribute to the supply of the same. In contrary, there will be a steady incentive to benefit 
from others’ efforts. If all resource appropriators decide to ‘free-ride’ in a situation of rivalry, 
everyone will be worse off in the end (OSTROM 1990). In order to overcome the problem of ‘free-
riding’, it is necessary to regulate exclusion through mechanisms that are accepted by all individuals 
that use the resource (see chapter 1.3).  
 
Irrigation systems also fall in this category. In this case rivalry refers to the fact that water abstracted 
from canals for crop irrigation to a large extent cannot be used by others (except for a small return 
flow when irrigation is sub-optimal). The second CPR-characteristic of irrigation water relates to the 
cost of excluding other potential beneficiaries from access to the resource. When faced with the 
possibility to extract irrigation water, farmers face the temptation of becoming ‘free-riders’, i.e. 
gaining benefits from the resource without contributing to the costs of providing, maintaining and 
regulating the the irrigation infrastructure (DOLŠAK/OSTROM 2003). 
1.2.3 Conclusion 
Along the characteristics of excludability and rivalry, three types of watershed services could be 
identified. 
 
First, watershed services that are public goods. This applies to the protection from natural disasters, 
like the protection from floods, droughts and landslides. These services are non-rival and it is 
impossible to exclude someone from the benefits they provide. A market-based mechanism for the 
payment of upstream providers of these services can therefore not be implemented, and a PWS-
scheme will only function, if a public authority sets incentives for upstream communities to supply the 
service.   
 
Watershed services that are public goods but can be transferred into toll/club goods (by making them 
exclusive) build a second category. Services related to improved water quality, like reduced 
sedimentation or reduced flow of nutrients, chemicals or salinity can be made exclusive through 
regulating the access to the water body, but they will always remain non-rival. Like in the case of 
public goods, a payment mechanism for the provision of these services will be most likely to function 
if a government agency pays upstream providers and regulates the downstream access to the water 
body by setting the prices. If there is only one private beneficiary (e.g. a hydropower company or a 
tourist rafting company), the service will automatically be exclusive – this can be assumed to be the 
easiest case to deliver payments for a watershed service, as there is no need for downstream institution 
building. In irrigation systems, payments could also be delivered, if the community manages to 
exclude community members that do not pay – in this case the service is similar to a CPR, even if it is 
non-rival. 
 
The third category of watershed services is CPRs. The characteristics of a CPR – rivalry and non-
excludability – apply to all watershed services related to the increase of water supply. In contrary to 
public goods, they can be traded between private buyers and sellers, but only if the access to the 
service on the buyers side is made exclusive. Under which circumstances can beneficiaries exclude 
someone from the service, who does not contribute to its supply? Three prerequisites have to be met 
(OSTROM 1990): 
                                                     
3 However it has to be mentioned that groundwater is often exclusive in the sense that exclusion comes along 
with poverty, because digging a well involves costs that cannot be covered by the poor.  
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1. Cleary defined boundaries: Clear definition of who has the right to utilise the service, and clear 
definition of the boundaries of the common pool resource itself 
2. Monitoring 
3. Graduated sanctions  
 
Individuals who make use of the watershed service will only be able to reach excludability, if they 
establish an institution that secures clearly defined boundaries and adequate tools for monitoring and 
sanctioning – i.e. if they cooperate.  
 
On the suppliers’ side, cooperation is in most cases necessary irrespective of the characteristics of the 
watershed service. This is due to the fact that the service usually cannot be provided by a few singled 
landholders. In developing countries, uphill providers will most likely be landholders with small 
parcels and a measurable environmental benefit for downstream communities will only be ensured if 
they collaborate (CFA).  
 
Summing up, it can be said that it depends on the degree of excludability and rivalry of a watershed 
service, whether a PWS-system can be based on a direct transfer mechanism between upstream and 
downstream individuals/communities/corporations, and to which extent the action of government 
agencies is required.  
A number of watershed services are found to be public goods, and government agencies will therefore 
have to take over the role of the buyer. Other watershed services are also non-rival, but they can be 
made exclusive and are then able to deliver payments. In the case of watershed services that are CPRs, 
the establishment of a market-like mechanism relies heavily on the level of cooperation on the 
beneficiaries’ side. In contrary to a market for a private good or service, where competition is the main 
driver, a ‘market’ for these watershed services cannot emerge without cooperation occurring first. 
 
The use of the term ‘market’ is rather illusive in the context of PWS. Concerning public goods like the 
protection from floods, a market arrangement will be unable to deliver payments for the provision of 
the service, and incentives for the provision of the service will have to be set by public authorities. If 
the demand for a service only comes from one single buyer, there will be no competition and the 
mechanism can thus not be defined as a ‘market’. In the case of the allocation of CPR, the term 
‘market’ may also be misleading, because the fundamental basis for such a PWS-system is 
cooperation, not competition. 
 
The key question is therefore not, whether markets should be introduced instead of cooperative 
institutions or government regulations, as they do not represent an alternative for the management of 
water resources. The question is rather, whether ‘market-like’ mechanisms are an appropriate tool for 
resolving the problem of unequal cost and benefit sharing in watershed management within a certain 
institutional framework based on cooperation or public regulation. If institutions for CPR-management 
do not exist or work properly, a PWS-system may also be the right tool to promote cooperation among 
water users. 
 
In the light of the CPR-characteristics of many watershed services, also within irrigation systems, the 
framework of E. OSTROM (1990) constitutes a useful starting point for possible characteristics of 
functioning systems for PWS, or what OSTROM terms ‘general design principles’.  
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1.3 The Ostrom Framework 
1.3.1 The ‘theory of the commons’ 
In her 1990 book ‘Governing the commons’, Elinor OSTROM proposes eight general principles for the 
design of long enduring institutions to manage CPR. 
 
The basic assumption in OSTROM’s ‘theory of the commons’ is that individuals may overcome the 
problems associated with the use of CPR (see chapter 1.2.2) through well designed institutions.  
This assumption is opposed to the perception that the common use of natural resources, which are of 
limited availability, will automatically lead to its degradation and thus to the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’. In the theory of the ‘tragedy of the commons’, constituted by HARDIN (1968), it is 
assumed that all individuals always act in their own self-interest and that the common interest of 
preserving the natural resource base is therefore undermined. This is pointed out by means of the 
following example: 
 “Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as 
many cattle as possible on the commons… […] As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to 
maximise his gain… Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman 
concludes that the only sensible course for him is to add another animal to his herd, and 
another, and another… Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination towards which all men 
rush.” 
In his ‘theory of collective action’, OLSON (1965) argues in a similar way. The author presumes that 
rational individuals in a community, which is based on economic interests, do not act in a way that 
allows pursuing a common goal. The presence of a common goal would accordingly not be sufficient 
to really generate collective action for realising this goal.  
 
OSTROM disagrees with the view that individuals using a CPR will generally not cooperate in order to 
pursue a common goal. She does not refuse the presented models as being wrong, but points out that 
they are based on certain extreme conditions that do not always exist in reality: In the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’, individuals distrust each other, act independently from each other and are not able to 
communicate and to conclude binding agreements with each other – they are not organised. In 
contrary, the author assumes that individuals are able to liberate themselves out of the dilemma 
situation. They are confronted with a problem of organisation, and from this point of view, resource 
degradation is the result of insufficient institutional regulation. Hence, the central analytical question 
is how institutions have to be designed in order to allow individuals to conclude credible agreements 
with each other and coordinate their actions, thus to cooperate. From a synthesis of a number of 
empirical case studies, OSTROM identifies a series of principles that are present in all scenarios that 
have over a long time period been able to successfully (i.e. sustainably) manage their CPR-system by 
means of local institutions (see Table 2). 
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1. Clearly defined boundaries 
Individuals of households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly 
defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself. 
  
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to 
local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material, and/or money. 
 
3. Collective-choice arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules. 
 
4. Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, are accountable to the 
appropriators or are the appropriators. 
 
5. Graduated sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on 
the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these 
appropriators, or both.  
 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among 
appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
 
7. Minimal recognition of right to organise 
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental 
authorities. 
 
8. Nested enterprises (for CPRs that are parts of larger systems) 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are 
organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
Table 2: Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions (according to Ostrom 1990) 
These design principles provide an idea of how institutions, which are able to manage CPR in a 
sustainable way, have looked like in reality. However, it cannot be reconstructed anymore how 
institutions in these cases were built up. The next chapter deals with OSTROM’s theoretical approach to 
answer the question, which conditions facilitate or favour the change of existing institutional 
regulations that do not function for people and the environment.  
1.3.2 Conditions of institutional change 
When presented to the thought of institutional change, farmers in the field will have to either support 
the continuance of the status quo institutional setting, or they can support an institutional change. The 
decision to support or not support an institutional change thereby depends on their view and weight of 
expected costs and benefits of such a change. How an individual evaluates expected costs and benefits 
depends in turn on the available information. Information and communication are therefore essential 
elements in any situation of institutional choice (see also chapter 2.2).  
 
OSTROM proposes a set of summary variables that will affect the individual’s decision to support or 
not support the change from the status quo. The summary variables include the benefit the farmer will 
have from the change, the cost the farmer will have to endure from a change, the degree of shared 
NIVA 5393-2007 
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norms within the affected groups, and the future possibilities of the farmer given the present day or the 
proposed institutional settings.  
 
However, a field setting needs to have certain characteristics for the researcher to be able to predict the 
values of the summary variables. According to OSTROM these are: 
1. Accurate summary measures must exist for each of the variables 
2. Individuals completely and accurately translate information about net benefits and net costs 
into expected benefits and expected costs 
3. Individuals do not behave in a strategic manner 
 
If these three conditions are met, the field researcher would only have to ascertain the values of the 
summary variables to predict individual strategies. However, unfortunately few or no field settings can 
be characterised by the conditions above, and consequently one must go beyond the summary 
variables and identify the situational variables that affect them. 
Situational variables that affect net benefits of alternative rules 
To get an overview of the situational variables that affect the net benefits of the proposed rules the 
researcher needs to consider the following questions: 
 What are the predicted average flows and the predicted values for the CPR in the future under 
a proposed set of rules, as compared with the status quo rules? 
 How variable is the flow of the CPR expected to be under a new set of rules compared with 
the status quo rules? 
 What quality differences will occur under a proposed set of rules compared with the status 
quo? 
 Will conflict be reduced, stay the same or increase under a proposed set of rules, as compared 
with the status quo rules? 
 How long is the resource itself likely to generate resource units? 
Situational variables that will affect net costs of alternate rules 
If the up front costs of transforming the rules are greater than the benefits of the same transformation, 
no more cost calculations will be done and the change in rule will not be imposed.  
 
Two major types of cost influence institutional change: 
 
1. Transformation cost 
 
These are costs are costs devoted to the process of considering a change of rules. Transformation costs 
are believed to be positive proportional with the numbers of individuals making institutional choices, 
the heterogeneity of interests, and the proportion of individuals that are minimally required to make 
institutional change. Transformation costs are also believed to be lower with skilful leaders, and are 
considered up-front costs.  
 
Situational variables affecting transformation costs: 
 Numbers of decision makers 
 Heterogeneity of interests 
NIVA 5393-2007 
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 Rules in use for changing rules 
 Skills and assets of leaders 
 Proposed rule 
 Past strategies of appropriators 
 Autonomy to change rules 
 
2. Transaction costs - Monitoring and enforcement cost  
 
These costs are the costs of making sure all involved are changing their behaviour according to the 
new set of rules that are proposed implemented. In many cases monitoring can be done by the 
participants themselves, while performing their daily activity, or participants must set aside time for 
this purpose, which hold an alternative value. The responsibility of monitoring and enforcement tasks 
might be shared by the participants or performed by an outside body. 
Situational variables affecting the monitoring and enforcement costs 
 Size and structure of the CPR 
 Exclusion technology 
 Appropriation technology 
 Marketing arrangement 
 Proposed rules 
 Legitimacy of rules in use 
Situational variables affecting the degree of shared norms 
Appropriators who live near the CPR from which they appropriate and who interact with each other in 
many situations apart from the sharing of the resource are likely to develop strong social norms that 
will enhance the trust the appropriators have in each other. This feeling of community will make it 
easier to cooperate in the sharing of the CPR because one individual “knows” the other, and trust him 
in taking part in the process of sustainable use of the CPR. The degree of shared norms together with 
information of opportunities elsewhere also affects the discount rate of the appropriators. The 
individuals living close to the CPR who trust the CPR to also supply their children will have lower 
discount rate then individuals who have business away from the CPR. Those who take their business 
elsewhere will not value future appropriation of the CPR simply because they do not rely on it to 
secure their future. 
 
The situational variables can be summarized as: 
 Appropriators live near CPR 
 Appropriators involved in many situations together 
 Information made available to the appropriators about opportunities that exist elsewhere. 
 
The variables affecting the decision of an individual in a situation of institutional choice are 
summarised and illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Variables affecting individuals’ institutional choice (according to OSTROM 1990) 
1.3.3 The relevance of Ostrom’s framework for PWS 
The resource systems investigated and characterised by OSTROM for developing her framework are 
local CPR-pools, where resource providers and beneficiaries are identical. In this respect, they differ 
from the initial situation in a PWS-context, which is based on the fact that they are not identical. In 
spite of this, OSTROM’s framework is still relevant in a PWS-scheme, where the watershed service is a 
CPR - particularly for establishing downstream management institutions.  
 
For upstream service sellers, the necessary level of cooperation does not go beyond a common 
cooperative – the goal of cooperation is to commonly sell a service and thus to generate income. 
Downstream communities are however faced with a typical ‘tragedy of the commons’ – situation. It 
only differs from the classical OSTROM-cases in that service users do not contribute to the provision of 
the service themselves, but have to make their payment/contribution to another upstream community 
that provides the service. The difficulties of CPR-management remain, and individual beneficiaries 
have to implement common actions in order to secure the provision of the watershed service. 
Moreover, the criteria may also be useful for the institutional design of intermediary organisations 
were negotiations between buyers and sellers take place. In this context, OSTROM’s framework is 
highly relevant for implementing PWS. An attempt to apply the criteria in a PWS-system is made in 
chapter 2.2. 
 
However, it has to be mentioned that the problems concerning OSTROM’s framework itself remain, 
too. First, there is the question of how to transfer the criteria into reality: How can institutions for 
CPR-management be built up, and can ‘common action’ be induced from the outside at all? Second, it 
is also unclear to what extent OSTROM’s criteria apply in scales larger than local communities. These 
questions have not been satisfactorily answered so far. Still, the ‘theory of the commons’ forms one of 
Information about benefits 
of proposed rules 
Information about costs of 
transforming, monitoring, and 
enforcing alternative rules 
Retain status quo rule: 
Previous strategies 
continued 
Aggregation rule in use 
for changing rules 
Information about 
shared norms and 
other opportunities 
Change status quo rule: 
New strategies adopted  
Internal world 
Internal norms 
Discount rate 
Expected benefits 
Support or not 
support change in 
status quo rules 
Expected costs 
External world 
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the most useful approaches for tackling the problems of collective action in natural resource 
management today, and it should therefore be made use of in the feasibility analysis of PWS-schemes.  
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2 Success factors and limitations to the 
establishment of markets for watershed services 
 
The aims of this chapter are to evaluate the conditions under which market-based approaches for 
providing watershed services are likely to be successful, and to assess the factors that constrain the 
implementation of a PWS mechanism.  
2.1 Biophysical limitations 
According to LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS (2002), a series of watershed services have been the subject of 
present market-based arrangements worldwide, the most common being services related to water 
quality, water table regulation and aquatic habitat protection. 
 
The most important biophysical fact influencing the success of a PWS scheme is a clear link between 
the applied activities and the provision of the service. It is essential that PWS is based on site-specific 
hydrological data, and not on general assumptions about land-water-linkages. Reliable data on land-
water-relations is important because it influences the credibility of service providers and thus the 
beneficiaries’ willingness to pay. Especially in developing countries, a lack of information in this 
regard is often a critical limitation to implementing PWS (LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002). If a 
management activity associated with the delivery of the service was identified, the service must then 
be well defined and made measurable. A general assumption is that water quality or sedimentation 
problems can be tackled easier by PWS than water flow problems, because it is less problematic to 
monitor and evaluate them (HOPE ET AL. 2005). The reason for this is that it is less difficult to measure 
the impacts of upstream land-use methods on downstream water quality/sedimentation than on the 
change of water flow. 
 
The geographical scale and characteristics of the watershed on which PWS is based also have an 
impact on how easy or difficult it is to measure the relations between upstream land-use and certain 
watershed services downstream. It can be assumed that it will be the more difficult to establish a clear 
connection, the further the geographical distances between providers and beneficiaries are. Still, the 
examples of successful PWS schemes (see PAGIOLA 2002; ALBÁN/WUNDER n.y.; MUÑOZ ET AL. 
2005; MUNAWIR ET AL. 2003) likewise refer to local, catchment and even national levels.  
 
FAO/REDLACH (2004) point out that PWS is an instrument to encourage landowners to implement 
practices which conserve natural resources and not a tool for integral environmental restoration – this 
is said to often surpass the capacities of PWS. 
 
While the ‘conservation’ motive may be possible to monitor for ecosystem services like carbon 
sequestration or even biodiversity, a case is more difficult to make for how conservation land uses 
provide additional watershed services relative to some baseline development/land use scenario. Some 
commonly held assumptions, or ‘myths’, regarding land-water-linkages have been compiled by the 
FAO: 
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Myth Possible reality 
Reforestation increases water availability Reforestation may decrease water availability 
Vegetative cover reduces the probability of big 
floods  
Vegetative may not have a significant impact on 
big floods 
Reforestation reduces erosion Reforestation may increase erosion (depending 
on the forest species used) 
Grazing and shifting agriculture are the major 
causes for the increase in sedimentation 
Climatic variations may be the major cause for 
sedimentation build-up 
Forests increase rainfall Forests may have little impact on rainfall, 
particularly at a local scale 
Table 3: Common land-water myths (source: FAO 2004) 
CALDER (2005) discusses these myths in greater detail and argues that they are reinforced by the 
media and can persist because they contain a fraction of truth. The following discussion of the myths 
or “mother statements” regarding the watershed services provided by forests is taken from CALDER 
(2005). 
Forests increase rainfall 
CALDER (2005) has reviewed literature and concluded that forests in some cases might lead to higher 
rainfall, due to the height of the trees that will lead to an increased orographic effect. However due to 
the increased evaporation from forest canopies, total availability of water resources will be reduced. 
The research reviewed by the author points in the direction that the effect of forest on rainfall is small, 
but can not be neglected totally from a water resource perspective. 
Forests reduce runoff  
New understanding indicates that in both wet and dry climates evaporation from forests is likely to be 
higher than from shorter crops and consequently runoff will be reduced from areas under forestation, 
contrary to the common belief. There are however some exceptions: 
 Cloud forests where cloud water deposition may exceed interception losses 
 Very old forests. Less evaporation due to smaller leaf area index 
 Broadleaf tree-species growing on chalk soil. 
 
Earlier catchment experiences by BOSCH/HEWLETT (1982) have reached similar conclusions. 
 
Soil cover and characteristics of the soil are in some studies found to be important factors in relation to 
runoff. RAO ET AL. (1998) have studied runoff patterns from alfa-soil which is abundant in the semi-
tropics. The authors argue that the surface crust formed on alfasoil greatly affects the infiltration rate 
in the soil. The regression analysis performed on the data showed that when the soil was covered by 
less than 30% with organic residue or amendments, the rainfall amount was the best predictive 
parameter for estimating runoff. When the soil was covered by more than 30%, rainfall amount and 
intensity, soil cover, and time from the beginning of the experiment were needed to estimate the 
runoff. Loss of rainwater as runoff on the structurally unstable crusting alfasoils was reduced 
effectively by maintaining high soil cover. Therefore, from a management point of view, the amount 
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of water available to the crop can be increased by application of straw and farmyard manure. (RAO ET 
AL. 1998) 
 
In the case of existing irrigation reservoirs, these are likely to receive upstream runoff containing 
nitrogen and phosphorus. A Japanese case study by NAKASONE/KURODA (1999) suggests a strong 
relationship between upstream landuse and water reservoir quality. To control eutrophication, 
measures must be taken to reduce N and P inputs from watersheds. Limiting the use of Nitrogen 
fertilizer was found to be the most important factor in regard to controlling the eutrophication of 
irrigation reservoirs. Next was the importance of building adequate sewage systems, and preserving 
the forested area between the irrigation reservoir and the upland fields. In addition, wetland in the 
watershed area, where nitrogen concentrations were found to be high (paddy), must be preserved. 
(NAKASONE/KURADA 1999) 
 
In trying to predict the runoff from tropical watersheds, PANDEY ET AL.(2003) have developed a model 
that is suggested for use in Indian watersheds.  
Forests regulate flows 
BOSCH/HEWLETT (1982) have done extensive research on the relation between forest and annual flow. 
The authors have summarized results of 94 catchment experiments and found that in none of the 
experiments water yield has increased with increases in forest cover. The approximate magnitude of 
changes can also be estimated. For example, pine and eucalyptus forest types on average cause a 
40mm change in water yield per 10% change in cover. 
 
It is important to underline the importance of distinguishing total annual flow and seasonal flows 
(BRUNIJNZEEL 2000, CALDER 2005). CALDER argues that competing processes might result in either 
reduced or increased dry season flow. He suggests that the geological conditions, which determine 
groundwater storage capacity, may be a critical factor in determining the range of low flow response 
following a change in vegetation cover. In none of the cases evidence of the "sponge effect" – this 
terms the process that forested soil stores water for then to gradually release it - can be found. CALDER 
argues that a forestation cannot be expected to increase dry season flows. 
 
PAGIOLA ET AL. (2002) have reached a different conclusion. They conclude that the evidences point 
towards a strong link between deforestation, rising water tables and increased dry season flow. 
However in some cases dry season flow has been reduced after the removal of forest. The authors state 
that factors that influence the outcome are tree species and the nature of land use that replaces the 
forest. 
Forests control erosion 
Water is the principal agent of erosion and is responsible for 56% of the world’s man induced soil 
degradation. Erosion by water occurs mainly as a result of sheet erosion, channel erosion or mass 
movement. Sheet erosion begins with drops of water striking the ground, releasing kinetic energy that 
breaks the bonds between soil particles. Movement of water across the ground is necessary for the 
transportation of soil particles.  Channel erosion includes bed and bank erosion, and can cause land 
degradation of land and sedimentation down-stream. Mass movement is associated with landsides 
caused by steep topography or tectonic movement. (CALDER 2005). 
 
Forests themselves do not necessarily reduce erosion. According to CALDER (2005), the effect on 
erosion provided by forests is dependent on the tree species and the ground cover. Case studies from 
Karnataka watershed in India have shown that canopies of Caribbean pine and eucalyptus, species 
exotic to India, have moderating effects on erosion in high intensive storms, while the canopy of the 
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indigenous teak do not help preventing erosion. Drops from the teak will always reach terminal 
velocity, which is more erosive than natural rainfall. CALDER also states the importance of ground 
cover vegetation to break the speed of falling drops and therefore reducing erosion. 
 
It is also argued that the clearest evidence of forest is in reducing sheet erosion. Research suggests that 
there are several important determinants of erosion rates. These are: Understory vegetation, soil 
composition, climate, raindrop size, terrain and slope gradient. Reviews of case studies from Malaysia 
suggest that selective logging might lead to higher erosion rates compared to cocoa and oil plant 
plantations (PAGIOLA ET AL. 2002).              
 
Some authors argue that ground cover is the chief determinant of erosion rates. Case studies performed 
by CHOMITZ/KUMARI (1998) have shown that ground cover rather than canopy is the chief 
determinant of erosion. Erosion rates in plots under current slash-and-burn cultivation are ten times as 
high as in natural forest. In plantations where weeds and litter have been removed, erosion is more 
than a hundred times greater than in natural forests. The authors further argue that road construction, 
annual cropping and plantations that remove litter can generate considerable erosion. 
 
The erosive effect of plants and ground cover has been examined by MOSS ET AL. (1987). Their 
findings conclude that the height of plants is the chief determinant of erosion rates. Experimental 
studies have shown that erosion effect increases above the height of 2m, and it was found that drops 
that were released below the height of 0,3m had no noticeable effect on erosion. 
The role of forests and evaporation: climate matters  
CALDER argues that when considering the evaporation rate from different forest surfaces, the climate 
is an important factor. Approaches using energy balance and aerodynamic transport equations place 
great emphasis on climatic “demand led” terms, which makes them appropriate for use in areas where 
moisture is abundant. In many parts of the world with dry climates however, moisture is scarce and 
evaporation from surfaces to the atmosphere is based on “supply led” terms. CALDER separates 
between short and tall crops, in wet-temperate, dry-temperate, wet-tropical, and dry-tropical areas. 
 
In conclusion, the watershed services forests provide are very site specific and depend on the 
characteristics of (among others) climate, tree species and the size of their leaves, root depth, soil 
conditions, slope and soil cover. Documenting their existence through baseline monitoring and 
modelling of the effects of land use changes is perhaps the prime challenge to the feasibility of PWS. 
2.2 Institutional limitations 
Which kind of institutional regulation is required for a PWS-system depends first of all on the 
characteristics of the watershed service and the beneficiaries (as discussed in chapter 1.2). If the 
watershed service, which is supposed to be provided through a PWS-system, is a public good (and the 
government is the buyer), or if there is only one private buyer, the institutional design of PWS will be 
less difficult as institution building in downstream communities is not necessary. 
 
In many cases however – so in the case of NIVA’s ‘India-PES’ project - , watershed services are 
related to the supply of water and thus to the problems of managing a CPR. As discussed in chapter 
1.2, appropriate institutions are an essential basis for introducing ‘market-like’ mechanisms in this 
context. The following presentation of institutional limitations and success factors within PWS refers 
to the framework of E. OSTROM (see chapter 1.3).  
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Clearly defined boundaries 
In order to exclude ‘free-riders’ it is necessary to define, which individuals or households are 
beneficiaries of the watershed service. It also must be defined, who the (potential) providers of the 
services are. This is not easy in many cases, and it will get more difficult and costly the larger the size 
of the watershed is. According to LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS (2002), most buyers and sellers of 
watershed services have so far been private individuals or corporations, whereas on the suppliers’ side, 
individual landowners are the dominating actors.  
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
The institutional mechanisms in a PWS-system must be appropriate for the participants’ capacities 
(FAO/REDLACH 2004). This is especially relevant in the context of poor people’s livelihood 
strategies (see chapter 2.4).   
A characteristic of a CPR is that it exhibits a high form of uncertainty in the flow of the stocks of the 
resource and in the effects that resource removal has. An important question is then how to devise 
institutions that are flexible enough to ensure the individual’s incentive for contribution in the 
management of the resource. Local conditions can change, and over time experiences are made and 
lessons learned regarding the convenience of applied mechanisms. It is therefore necessary to ensure 
enough flexibility in a programme, so that adjustments can be made (CFA). 
Collective-choice arrangements 
Broad participation on the suppliers’ and the beneficiaries’ side is required in a PWS-system. In this 
context it is important that all buyers and sellers are involved in all stages and that they have decision 
autonomy about their institutional mechanisms. This is because all stakeholders will have to find the 
mechanisms in their own interest to accept and follow the rules and regulations of the scheme (CFA). 
The bigger the watershed is and the more stakeholders the system involves, the more difficult it will be 
to negotiate a mechanism, which is accepted by all. 
Mechanisms for monitoring, sanctioning and conflict resolution 
Effective mechanisms for monitoring, sanctioning and conflict resolution are a substantial basis within 
a PWS management institution in order to secure that all households comply with the rules and 
regulations they have agreed on. A basis for this is the availability of appropriate infrastructure for 
these mechanisms (CFA). According to OSTROM (1990), in most institutions, which have managed 
CPR in a sustainable way over a long period of time, monitoring and sanctioning are not undertaken 
by external agents, but by the participants themselves. In other functioning cases, agents who monitor 
a system are officials that are accountable to the participants. If a government agency fulfils these 
functions, it will therefore be essential to ensure that they are fully transparent and impartial (CFA). 
Transparency is a key element to ensure the participants’ trust in the monitoring system. Institutions 
that are transparent and empower people to voice their discontent are particularly necessary in order to 
tackle corruption, which is at the core of the governance problem in the water sector worldwide 
(STÅLGREN 2006). Monitoring systems must also be capable to detect unintended effects of a PWS 
scheme, because there is the danger that perverse incentives arise for households not included in the 
system, such as deforestation or destruction (FAO 2004).  
Minimal acceptance of right to organise 
The right of participants to decide about their own mechanisms to govern the PWS-system may not be 
questioned by external governmental authorities. This is often a major obstacle in watershed 
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management, because reluctance to stakeholder participation is common in government agencies that 
were formerly in charge of decision making. Involving these authorities is often based on the 
assumption that they share the stakes (FAO-SARD-M).  
Additional aspects in the context of PWS 
One key institutional factor in PWS is the connection between buyers and sellers. Effective 
intermediary organisations are in this context helpful to decrease transaction costs (WAAGE ET AL. 
2006; LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002/GUTMAN 2003). According to the study of LANDELL-
MILLS/PORRAS (2002), intermediary-based transactions have so far been the most commonly applied 
mechanism for implementing a PWS-scheme. Most often NGOs and community organisations have 
been used as intermediaries. They usually take over the function of channelling the payments from 
downstream to upstream.  
 
Another fundamental key to making PWS institutions work is a functioning information flow among 
the stakeholders and the involved public institutions. This applies before the implementation of the 
system, where the initiative has to be widely publicised and discussed, and after implementation in 
order to sustainably ensure acceptance and proper operation through transparency (FAO 2004; CFA). 
An obstacle for the communication in a watershed may be the gaps between three types of knowledge 
on watershed functions: 
 Public/policy ecological knowledge 
 Scientists’ (modellers’) ecological knowledge 
 Local ecological knowledge. 
 
It is required that these three knowledge groups get connected and interact with each other (JEANES ET 
AL. 2006).  
 
A basic institutional condition for PWS on the suppliers’ side and one of the most common constraints 
in developing countries are clearly defined property rights. This is also the case in India, where there 
is usually no clear, secure or fair tenure for local forest dwellers. For most forests, there is no legal 
demarcation of access boundaries between villages or patch-wise assignments of rights to specific 
groups or individuals (Lele 2006).  
On the other hand, securing of property rights can also be a good incentive for applying watershed 
protection works, as the example of Vietnam showed (DUNG THE/THANH HA/QUOC CHINH 2004; see 
chapter 3.3). 
 
Even if the discussed success factors are given it is important not to forget that PWS is a political 
process, which means that the relevance of interest and power structures may not be underestimated. 
Especially in developing countries, highly unequal social conditions often prevail. PWS will only be 
positive for suppliers however, if they have the adequate capacity to negotiate with (often more 
powerful) beneficiaries and get a fair price for their services (FAO-SARD-M; GEOGHEGAN 2005). 
This can be a major constraint, if there are big class or caste differences between buyers and sellers. It 
is emphasised by the FAO (2004) that in contexts of highly unequal power or income distribution, 
markets are usually not the appropriate instruments to solve social conflicts. Power structures can also 
constrain the implementation of biophysically suitable watershed protection works, if beliefs 
associated with power prevail over scientific knowledge. Reliable technical knowledge should 
therefore always be part of all negotiation processes (HOPE ET AL. 2005). 
 
Cultural factors can also influence the feasibility of PWS. If there is a strong resistance against the 
idea of water services being a market good rather than a right, other mechanisms may be more 
effective because they generate less opposition (FAO 2004). General cultural resistance can also exist 
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against the idea that downstream communities should decide what land use upstream communities 
adopt (LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002). 
2.3 Financial/economic limitations 
One of the biggest constraints to PWS is the high transaction costs that have to be overcome before 
the implementation of a scheme, which is likely to be successful. The main reasons are: 
 Extensive biophysical studies on local land-water linkages are necessary in order to document 
the ‘additionality’ of certain land-uses. 
 Socioeconomic appraisals have to be conducted in order to identify potential buyers and 
sellers, opportunity costs of service provision and beneficiaries’ ‘willingness to pay’ for the 
service.  
 In many cases, property rights are unclear and need to be regulated.  
 If the stakeholders are not organised yet, institutions have to be built up. 
 Within these institutions, broad participation is essential on both the suppliers and the 
beneficiaries side (see chapter 1.2.3). This involves high costs and is very time-consuming; 
e.g. in a project in Ghana, costs for participation accounted for 66% of the project costs and 
80% of the project time4. 
 Necessary capacity building on negotiation, financial accounting, contract formulation, 
technical skills etc. is costly. 
(FAO/REDLACH 2004; WWF 2006; LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002) 
 
PWS can thus be very expensive compared to other management options and it is a challenge to 
design the system in a way that secures that transaction costs do not surpass the generated benefits. 
Transaction costs will diminish substantially if the stakeholders are already organised and if some kind 
of payment mechanism (e.g. a water fee) already exists (WWF 2006).  
 
Another critical limitation to PWS is that there must be an actual demand for the service, i.e. there 
must be the willingness to pay to ensure a sustainable efficient allocation of resources. A generally 
perceived and recognisable problem must therefore be located at the outset of every PWS project 
(HOPE ET AL. 2005). Moreover, the willingness to pay must be high enough to exceed forgone 
opportunity costs of the service providers (CFA). There are many reasons, why potential buyers of a 
watershed service lack the willingness to pay. The most common reasons are (LANDELL-
MILLS/PORRAS 2002; WUNDER/DUNG THE/IBARRA 2005; GEOGHEGAN 2005): 
 Stakeholders are used to receiving the service for free. 
 Stakeholders see watershed services as a benefit that the state must provide. 
 Stakeholders lack the necessary finance to pay; this may also be the case if the government is 
the potential buyer. 
 
Potential buyers’ willingness to pay also depends on earmarking of created funds. They have to be 
used to address the identified problem, and not go into general revenue, as beneficiaries must be 
convinced that their payments will not be misused (CFA, LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002). 
 
                                                     
4 LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS (2002) quoted after MAGRATH, P. ET AL. (1997): Cost-benefit analysis of client 
participation in agricultural research: A case study from Ghana. London (=AgREN Network Paper No. 74b). 
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The next hurdle before the implementation of a PWS system is the question of financing investment 
costs, which is often necessary for watershed protection works, e.g. for terracing of slopes. In these 
cases it is essential that enough start capital is available, because a change in land-use must take place 
in an area that is large enough to have a measurable impact. However, access to financing and lending 
is difficult in many rural regions of developing countries (FAO/REDLACH 2004). 
 
Concerning the financial sustainability of a PWS programme, it must be ensured that the system can 
be maintained with local financial resources. This is highlighted in the literature because some existing 
schemes are highly dependent on external funding (FAO 2004; DUNG THE/THANH HA/QUOC CHINH 
2004). Sustainability is also influenced by choosing the right form of compensation. Cash payments 
obviously seem to be the best incentive for service suppliers, but they also involve the risk of 
becoming unsustainable if they are not well managed (FAO/REDLACH 2004). Hence, compensations 
do not necessarily consist of cash payments, but have to be adapted to the specific context. In some 
cases, people prefer e.g. road improvements, more secure land tenure etc. (HOPE ET AL. 2005). 
2.4 PWS and poverty alleviation 
This chapter deals with the question under which conditions PWS is an instrument that benefits the 
poor, and explores possible opportunities and constraints for implementing a pro-poor PWS scheme. 
The topic is highly relevant because frequently the impacts that market based instruments can have on 
the livelihoods of marginalised groups are neglected. On the other hand, PWS is also often 
overestimated as a strategy for poverty reduction.  
 
There are several poor groups in society whose livelihood may be affected, positively or negatively, 
by a PWS programme. They can be divided into four groups: 
 
1. upstream landholders 
2. upstream landless 
3. service users 
4. consumers (applies to all poverty groups) 
 
One of the difficulties of a pro-poor PWS programme seems to be the danger that it may have positive 
welfare effects for one poverty group while making others worse off. It is therefore important to 
consider possible impacts on all of these groups.  
PWS and poor upstream landholders 
When PWS is discussed as an instrument for poverty reduction, it is usually referred to poor upstream 
landholders as the main target group. In this context, PWS may have a series of potential positive 
impacts: The diversification of income sources through PWS and the regularity of the received 
payments can build an important contribution to the improvement of livelihoods for poor service 
providers as vulnerability is decreased (LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002). Another potential positive 
impact which is highlighted in the literature is the effect PWS can have on the social capital of poor 
people, because internal organisation is promoted (PAGIOLA/ARCENAS/PLATAIS 2004). The case of 
Adilabad (see chapter 3.1.5) offers an idea of how PWS could combine watershed protection and 
poverty reduction. However, the challenge to design PWS in a way that allows poor people to 
participate in the programme must not be underestimated. All constraints discussed above fall hardest 
on the poor, and hence they often lack the access to the market. The following aspects seem to be the 
most relevant: 
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 Poor people more often lack secure land property rights than better-off community members. 
Moreover, they have smaller plots, which complicates the coordination of supply and 
increases transaction costs in relation to the potential gain (LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 
2002/FAO-SARD-M).  
 The financing of necessary investment costs to participate in a PWS programme is a major 
obstacle. The poor are predominantly affected of lacking access to credit 
(PAGIOLA/ARCENAS/PLATAIS 2004; FAO-SARD-M). 
 Poor people often lack the necessary skills to participate in PWS schemes. This concerns 
technical skills as well as management capacities (LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002/FAO-
SARD-M). It is also important to bear in mind that illiteracy is wide spread among the poor. 
This was a problem in Vietnam, where many households did not know what their PWS 
contract contained as they were not able to read it (DUNG THE/THANH HA/QUOC CHINH 
2004). 
 Power issues (as discussed in chapter 2.2) are particularly important to consider in the context 
of marginalised groups. Due to their lack of education and political power, the poor may be 
forced into unfavourable deals when negotiating with more powerful downstream 
communities (LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002). 
There are a number of suggestions on how to ensure that poor upstream households are able to 
participate in a PWS scheme. In general, transaction costs have to be kept as low as possible 
(PAGIOLA/ARCENAS/PLATAIS 2004). This means for example that commodities should be defined in a 
simple way that is adapted to poor people’s livelihood strategies: 
 They need to be flexible in order to allow participants to respond to unexpected shocks. 
 A shorter duration of contracts may help reduce risks for sellers and buyers. (LANDELL-
MILLS/PORRAS 2002/GUTMAN 2003) 
The same applies for payment-mechanisms: Considering local capacities and likely implementation 
costs, simple payment mechanisms are usually most appropriate.  
For poor households with small parcels of land being able to compete, it is essential to support 
cooperative institutions to secure their bargaining power (GUTMAN 2003). It is also essential to 
formalise property or tenure rights, if they are not clear (LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002). 
As poor people often lack the necessary skills to access a market, investments have to aim on 
improving their skills in marketing, negotiation, financial accounting, agricultural techniques etc. 
Further, to be able to participate in a PWS system that promotes a change in agricultural production 
activities (in contrary to a system that promotes reduced agricultural activity), access to start-up capital 
is necessary. It is therefore reasonable to provide access to credits; although it is questionable, whether 
a PWS-system will be capable of addressing this problem, if rural banks do not exist.  
A recommendation that is usually made in the context of improving poor people’s access to markets, 
and which also applies in the context of PWS, is to establish a market support centre. This will be the 
central spot, where information on prices and transaction is distributed for free and which serves as a 
contact point. It can also be a bureau for advice on the design of contracts and other managerial issues 
(LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002; GUTMAN 2003). 
A danger that has to be considered is that a PWS-programme may raise the interest of powerful people 
in appropriating the marginal lands of the poor due to the increased value (GRIEG-
GRAN/PORRAS/WUNDER 2005).  
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PWS and the upstream landless poor 
It is very important to consider the possible impacts of a PWS-scheme on the landless, because being 
the poorest of the poor, their livelihoods will be affected the most by an intervention like PWS. 
Investigations show that Indian watershed development projects have generally had mainly negative 
impacts for landless people. The projects most successful in terms of environmental conservation and 
productivity thereby had the most negative effects on the landless poor, and especially on poor 
women. This is due to the fact that watershed development is often connected with the closure of 
common lands that the landless usually depend on (KERR 2002; SENGUPTA ET AL. 2003).  
In this context, PWS has the potential to benefit landless people: They may be potential sellers of 
watershed services, if they use common land that provides these services. In this case it will be 
essential though to clearly define who is part of the group that processes the common lands. PWS will 
also affect the livelihoods of the landless in a positive way, if it increases the demand in labour 
(GRIEG-GRAN/PORRAS/WUNDER 2005). The case of Adilabad (see chapter 3.1.5) offers a promising 
example of how watershed protection can help to reduce poverty by generating employment. On the 
other hand, a PWS project has to watch out for the danger that it reduces employment opportunities by 
promoting less agricultural activity and thus deteriorates the situation of the landless.  
PWS and poor service users 
Environmental degradation does not affect all social groups to the same extent. It is the poor that are 
hurt the most by declining watershed services. GEOGHEGAN (2005) therefore argues that PWS-
programmes must be constructed in ways that are in favour of marginalised groups. 
A poor downstream farmer will benefit from a PWS-system, if the increase in income through 
improved watershed services exceeds the costs he has to pay for these services. This depends on 
factors such as the type of watershed service itself and the structure of the applied tariff system. 
However, it is a challenge to design a tariff system that ensures the equal access of poor users to the 
watershed service. Even if costs are linked to farm size or the volume of water used, poor households 
are likely to be disadvantaged because they have to spend a larger share of their income. Besides, in 
settings of highly unequal economic power among beneficiaries, poor households may not benefit 
because funds are only channelled towards the interests of wealthy users due to their ability to make 
higher contributions (LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 2002). 
One possibility of solving the problem of unequal benefit sharing is the de-linking of land and water 
rights, like it was applied in the Indian village of Sukhomajri (see chapter 3.1.1). If every household is 
given the same share of water in return for a certain payment or labour contribution, even landless 
people will be able to benefit from the improved watershed services by selling their rights. However, 
the experiences with transferring the system to other villages have not been promising. In many cases, 
villagers could not be convinced to share water rights equally (KERR 2002). Differences in class and 
caste seemed to be a major obstacle; in the villages of Harijan and Lavana (Indian State of Haryana), 
the model did not take off because higher castes were unwilling to buy water from “untouchables” 
(SENGUPTA ET AL. 2003). 
Poor consumers 
Rural areas can be rather isolated from global food markets, even if the country is integrated in 
international markets. PWS may then have an impact on food prices, if it diminishes the local supply 
of main food crops. Higher food prices will hurt all poverty groups that rely on purchased food. 
ZILBERMAN ET AL. (2006) therefore argue that a sub-national scale of analysis regarding food markets 
will be necessary if PWS implies changes in the cultivation of food crops. 
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Conclusion on the distributional impacts of PWS 
It is important to note that PWS is not primarily an instrument for poverty reduction, because it cannot 
be targeted to areas with high poverty. As it is the very basis of PWS to generate watershed services, 
the programme must be targeted to areas that deliver these services for downstream beneficiaries. 
Hence, PWS will only have the potential to contribute to poverty alleviation, if there are high poverty 
rates in the relevant areas. But even if this is the case, a very careful design of the scheme is required 
in order to secure that poor people are able to participate as service providers 
(PAGIOLA/ARCENAS/PLATAIS 2004). 
 
As it was discussed, a PWS system may also have substantial impacts on other poverty groups than 
service providers. It is therefore important to apply a systematic approach to check possible livelihood 
effects on all of these groups before implementing a PWS programme. The Sustainable Livelihoods 
Approach may be one method that can be used in this context (GRIEG-GRAN/PORRAS/WUNDER 2005).  
In general, PWS has the potential to benefit the poor if 
 the areas that provide watershed services have high poverty rates, 
 investments are made in the ability of poor service providers to cope with the market, 
 activities for watershed protection increase labour demand and 
 the downstream poor share the benefits of improved watershed services.  
 
Potential impacts on different poverty groups and strategies to design PWS in a way that favours these 
groups are summarised in Table 4. 
 
Poverty group Potential positive impacts Potential negative impacts Pro-poor strategies  
Upstream small 
landholders 
 decreased vulnerability 
through additional, 
regular income 
 increase of social capital 
 loss of income through 
unfavourable deals with more 
powerful downstream 
beneficiaries 
 loss of land due to higher 
interest of powerful in 
marginal lands 
 make sure poor 
landholders have 
access to the market 
and are able to cope 
with it 
Upstream landless  higher income through 
more employment 
opportunities 
 higher income through 
participation as service 
providers 
 loss of income through loss of 
employment opportunities 
 loss of income through closure 
of common lands 
 create employment 
opportunities in 
watershed protection 
works 
 promote formalising of 
usage rights for 
common lands if 
landless are potential 
service providers 
Service users  income benefits through 
improved watershed 
services 
 loss of access to water if they 
cannot pay 
 design tariff systems in 
a way that secures poor 
people’s equal access 
to the watershed 
services 
Consumers 
(applies to all 
groups) 
  higher food prices  make sure PWS does 
not decrease local food 
crop supply in remote 
areas 
Table 4: Potential impacts on poverty groups and pro-poor strategies in PWS 
(source: compiled by the author) 
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2.5 Summary 
In the following, a summary of the success conditions for PWS is presented in form of a checklist of 
feasibility criteria. The following questions should be evaluated before the implementation of a PWS-
scheme. If all of of them can be answered with “yes”, there will be favourable conditions for 
implementing PWS.  
 
Biophysical conditions 
 Is there a clear link between the applied activities and the provision of the service? 
 Is the service well defined and measurable? 
 
Institutional conditions 
 Are suppliers and beneficiaries clearly defined? 
 Is a PWS mechanism accepted and demanded by all stakeholders? 
 Do cooperational institutions on both the supplierss’ and the beneficiaries’ side exist? 
 Is there an effective intermediary organisation for the connection of buyers and sellers? 
 Is there a functioning information flow among all stakeholders and public authorities? 
 Are all stakeholders represented in the management institutions and do they have decision 
autonomy about their institutional mechanisms? 
 Do external government agencies respect the right of participants to decide about their own 
mechanisms? 
 Are effective mechanisms for monitoring, sanctioning and conflict resolution in place? Are 
agents who fulfil monitoring and sanctioning fully accountable to participants? Are 
monitoring mechanisms capable of detecting unintended effects of a PWS system? 
 Are the institutional rules flexible enough to being able to adapt to changing conditions? 
 Are property/tenure rights on the suppliers’ side clearly defined? 
 
Financial/Economic conditions 
 Can a PWS mechanism be designed without transaction costs surpassing the generated 
benefits? 
 Is there a willingness to pay by downstream beneficiaries that is high enough to exceed 
forgone opportunity costs of service providers? 
 Is it secured that the created funds are used to address the identified problem? 
 
Social conditions 
 Have power structures taken into account and is it likely that there will be a fair negotiation 
process between upstream and downstream communities? 
 Is it secured that poor landholders are able to participate in the PWS-system? 
 Is it secured that the PWS-scheme does not reduce employment opportunities for landless 
people? 
 Are tariff systems on the beneficiaries’ side designed in a way that secures poor people’s 
access to the service? 
 Is it secured that PWS does not decrease local food crop supply (in remote areas)? 
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3 Overview: Existing PWS-related approaches in 
India and Asia 
For the following chapter, a literature research on existing PWS-related approaches in India and Asia 
was carried out. The cases presented in the following derive from both studies on particular cases and 
more general works and guidelines on PWS that referred to certain examples for market-based 
mechanisms. The presented cases were chosen because of their relevance for introducing the concept 
of PWS in India and Asia, and they represent a rather broad spectrum of ideas, how market based 
mechanisms may be used for the allocation of water resources.  
3.1 India 
3.1.1 De-linking of land and water rights in Sukhomajri Village, Haryana 
The case of the village Sukhomajri in the Indian state of Haryana is often referred to in order to show 
that market based approaches can affect both the provision of watershed services and the livelihoods 
of poor upstream communities in a positive way (SENGUPTA ET AL. 2003; LANDELL-MILLS/PORRAS 
2002). Furthermore, the case is of special interest as new market based arrangements were generated 
on two scales: First, on a macro scale, involving the downstream city of Chandigarh and the upstream 
community of Sukhomajri village, and second, on the local level of Sukhomajri village itself. 
 
In the early 1970s, the city of Chandigarh was confronted with the rapid increase of siltation of 
Sukhna Lake, an artificial water body that was of high recreational value to the people of Chandigarh. 
The Central Soil and Water Conservation Research and Training Institute (CSWCRTI), which was 
assigned by the city administration to solve the problem, found that the heavily degraded mountain 
land near Sukhomajri village accounted for 80-90% of the silt flowing into the lake. Due to the 
degradation of their lands, the local villagers themselves were constantly forced to clear more forest 
for practicing agriculture and grazing of cattle and goats. It was realised that the local families would 
have to be compensated in some way if they should be motivated to give up free grazing and free tree 
felling in the hills. Therefore, two earthen dams for water harvesting during the monsoon were built by 
the Chandigarh Administration and the involved research institute. The villagers were able to obtain 
enormous irrigation benefits from the dam, and their agricultural production increased fourfold. The 
water availability for irrigation marked an immediate incentive for them to stop grazing in the hills and 
initiate watershed protection work: If they wanted the dam to deliver water, they would have to 
prevent the dams from silting up by protecting the vegetation cover of the surrounding area. The 
project led to the substantial reduction of siltation rates in Sukhna Lake. The investment made by the 
city of Chandigarh in the dams can be seen as a payment for the watershed service that it received. It 
must be noted, though, that for the Sukhomajri people, the local benefits of irrigation water rather than 
an external payment have been the main incentive for their watershed protection activities. 
 
The crucial factor, which led to the success of the project, was the principle of equitable sharing of the 
benefits out of the collective protection work at the local level. In the beginning there were problems 
because costs and benefits of the dam were spread unequally across the community; while some 
benefited, others had to give up their traditional grazing rights in the hills. To overcome this problem, 
a market based solution was introduced: All households in the village, including the landless, were 
assigned an equal share of the water collected in the dam in return for their participation in watershed 
protection activities. Hence, the landless and those with very small landholdings were able to sell their 
water rights to larger landowners who needed more water. The de-linking of water rights from land 
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rights compensated the landless and the small landowners for the loss of access to traditional grazing 
lands and allowed them to gain an equal share of the watershed benefits.  
 
In this context, the literature also refers to examples of a few other Indian villages, where similar 
market based mechanisms for equal benefit sharing of watershed protection works have been 
successfully introduced. However, as discussed in chapter 2.4, not all attempts to transfer the 
Sukhomajri model to other sites were successful. 
3.1.2 Traditional irrigation systems (kuhls), Himachal Pradesh 
In their study on PWS in India SENGUPTA ET AL. (2003) also highlighten examples of inter-village 
institutions for natural resource management. The functioning of traditional irrigation systems offers 
an interesting insight into existing market-like cooperation systems between upstream and downstream 
communities in India, and thus points of departure for developing other market-oriented forms of 
inter-village transactions. 
One of these examples is the traditional community irrigation system of kuhls (channels for water 
transfer from upstream to downstream) in the State of Himachal Pradesh. Over the years, upstream 
and downstream communities have developed precise rules and regulations regarding the amount of 
water that is released to different villages at certain times and of the labour that downstream 
communities have to provide for maintaining the upstream kuhls. 
Being established between the villages on the base of negotiations, the kuhls system is conceptually 
closer to a market-like system than to a state-controlled regulatory framework. Traditional institutions 
for the management of irrigation infrastructure are therefore useful for the development of other 
upstream-downstream transactions for watershed services.  
3.1.3 Direct payment agreement for the improvement of water supplies between 
villages in Himachal Pradesh 
Also in the State of Himachal Pradesh, a case of a direct compensational transaction from downstream 
to upstream communities was found. The two downhill villages of Suan and Ropri were facing a 
problem of water scarcity due to the degradation of common lands that belonged to the upstream 
village of Bhodi. Because the Bhodi villagers themselves were not facing any problem regarding their 
water resources, the villagers of Suan and Ropri agreed to provide free labour for watershed protection 
works of the Bhodi lands. In addition, they transferred the government payments they received for this 
work to the village fund of Bhodi. The Bhodi villagers, on the other hand, agreed to diminish the 
collection of grasses and fuel wood from the common lands. Through the restoration of their lands, the 
Bhodi villagers were able to increase their income due to the sale of grass that had started 
regenerating. This provided sufficient incentives for them to continue the protection of their common 
lands, even without further contributions from Suan and Ropri villages.  
This case offers an example of how even one-off payments/labour contributions from downstream 
beneficiaries to upstream communities can deliver incentives for sustainable watershed management 
over the long term (GEOGHEGAN, T. 2005; SENGUPTA 2003). 
3.1.4 Hydropower companies as beneficiaries in Himachal Pradesh 
In Himachal Pradesh, downstream hydropower companies are already financially contributing to 
upstream forest and watershed protection works. The payments are based on the Environment 
Protection Act (1986) and the Forest Conservation Act (1980) and are compulsory. It is therefore 
difficult to say, whether the hydropower companies would be willing to pay for the watershed services 
on a voluntary basis. But the reduction in silt flow is a watershed service of great importance for the 
companies, as siltation of dams is a major problem and causes heavy costs.  
The payments are not made regularly, but on a per project bases. Further, the beneficiaries do not pay 
the upstream service providers directly, but the money goes to the State first, from where it is 
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reallocated to the Forest Department. It is therefore not ensured that the total amount of payments 
made is actually used for watershed protection works, nor that upstream communities benefit from the 
transactions (SENGUPTA ET AL. 2003).  
3.1.5 Community-based environmental and financial management in Adibala District, 
Andhra Pradesh 
The recent development in Adilabad District, Andhra Pradesh, demonstrates how payments for 
watershed services can contribute to poverty alleviation and empowerment of marginalised 
communities in a substantial way.  
Within the Andhra Pradesh Participatory Tribal Development Project, supported by the Government 
of India, IFAD and the World Bank, a strategy of building up thrift and savings groups (frequently 
also denoted as Self-help Groups (SHG)) among tribal women was started in 1994 in order to improve 
the livelihoods of tribal peoples and reduce environmental degradation. In the first years of the project, 
social mobilisation and savings among the SHGs, which are comprised of 8-14 women, were low. 
However, the project made an important breakthrough in 2000, when it was decided that funds for 
watershed protection works should be directly transferred to the SHG. An IFAD Coordinator spent 
two days in the first village, where the approach was applied, to discuss the objectives of the 
programme with the women, and to motivate them to implement the watershed protection works. 
Finally, the SHG was given a contract for watershed protection with the Integrated Tribal 
Development Agency (ITDA). Then, around 50 villagers carried out a project of building two 
diversion drains to check soil erosion during the monsoon and improve soil moisture retention in the 
downstream farmland. The SHG was paid a sum of Rs. 85,000 (around 1,820US$) for the work, and 
after paying the wages to the participating community members, the SHG was able to save 
approximately 30% of the funds in the group’s thrift account. This approach was applied with great 
success in over 500 SHG in 300 villages in Adilabad district. The design and location of soil and water 
conservation works and the maintenance of the management structures was improved by transferring 
the funds directly to the community institutions, because a greater sense of ownership was built up. 
Many of the SHG were able to increase their savings several fold by taking over the responsibility for 
watershed protection works. In addition, the project provided assistance for the SHG to learn how to 
manage finances, reinvest the money they earn and manage restoration projects over time. The 
economic success of the SHGs has had immensely positive impacts on social development: 
Households started spending more money on the education of the children, literacy among women 
increased, the population growth rate has fallen from 2.42% to 1.39% within 10 years (1991-2001) and 
poverty levels are decreasing.  
The case of Adilabad shows how PWS can achieve ecological goals, while addressing social and 
poverty issues at the same time (D’SILVA/PINGLE/POFFENBERGER 2004; PFOFFENBERGER). 
3.2 Indonesia 
An example of voluntary contracts for watershed services between downstream beneficiaries and 
upstream villages comes from Segara River Basin in Indonesia. In the watershed, several financial 
arrangements have been developed independently. Among the contributors to upstream watershed 
protection activities are farmers with irrigated land and other downstream residents. The most 
important contributions are made by two companies, a drinking water company and a tourist rafting 
company. They both depend on good water quality and quantity and have entered into formal contracts 
with the upstream village of Bentek. The payments are made on an annual basis in order to support 
forest guards, infrastructure improvement and the traditional systems of forest protection in the 
village. This is the only case of ongoing direct payments between downstream beneficiaries and 
upstream service providers in Asia that was found in the literature review (MUNAWIR ET AL. 2003).  
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3.3 Vietnam 
In Vietnam, a number of PWS-related mechanisms have been applied within projects by IFAD, Sida 
and The World Agroforestry Centre. The PWS scheme as such has not been implemented yet, but the 
case studies provide examples of how to reward upland farmers for environmental services. 
Four applied mechanisms of rewarding upland farmers for their watershed protection works were 
found by DUNG THE/THANH HA/QUOC CHINH (2004) in their study of PWS-linked activities in 
Vietnam: 
 First, and most important, the assurance of property rights of the cultivated land 
 Cash, free planting materials and employment opportunities 
 Harvesting of timber and NTFP 
 Improved environmental services for the communities themselves 
 
Similar to the case of Adilabad, India, within the existing projects in Vietnam upstream communities 
are rewarded for their watershed services by the government and not by private service buyers. This 
implies a sustainability problem as it is questionable whether the government will be able to continue 
paying the rewards. The challenge of connecting upland farmers as sellers to downstream buyers of 
watershed services therefore remains.  
3.4 The Philippines 
The best known case of PWS from the Philippines is the development of a Master Plan for Makiling 
Forest Reserve, 100km south of Manila. The Master Plan was developed by the University of the 
Philippines in collaboration with UNEP, the Resources, Environment and Economics Center for 
Studies (REECS) and the Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) in order 
to encounter the problems of declining water quality and increasing scarcity of water supplies. 
However, the challenge was the financing of the watershed protection works foreseen in the plan. In 
2000, a proposal for a Watershed Protection and Conservation Fee was presented. It is suggested that a 
fee for upstream watershed protection should be added to the water bills of downstream users, 
focussing on the main users like Water Districts responsible for potable water and tourist resorts at the 
beginning. Downstream users’ willingness to pay was estimated to be significantly higher than the 
estimated costs of the service provision. Unfortunately, the available literature does not provide 
information on the progress of the plan’s implementation (LANDELL-MILLS 2002; ROSALES 2003). 
3.5 Summary and lessons learned 
The identified cases of PWS-related approaches in India and Asia provide only limited guidance on 
how to implement a PWS-scheme in the region. Mainly, because experiences are basically limited to 
cases that do not represent PWS-schemes according to the common definition, i.e. ongoing direct 
payments from downstream beneficiaries to upstream service providers. The case of Segara River 
Basin, Indonesia, is the only identified case, which can be classified as a ‘PWS-system’.  Further, the 
literature about most of these cases does not go very far into detail. For instance, detailed information 
about the applied payment mechanisms is generally missing. 
 
However, the reviewed cases do provide ideas of how payments and other compensation mechanisms 
can be used for solving water related conflicts and allocating resources in a sustainable way, and thus 
they form points of departure for developing PWS-systems in other locations. 
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Although it can be assumed that it is usually more difficult to assess clear biophysical upstream-
downstream linkages the larger the scale is, most of the PWS-related approaches, and the furthest 
developed at the same time, were surprisingly found on the catchment level (see Table 5). This 
indicates that further distances between the location of service providers and beneficiaries have not 
been a major obstacle for implementing payment arrangements. In all cases on the catchment level, 
erosion/siltation problems made up the basis for developing innovative solutions. In India, no market-
based systems exist on this level yet. In the case of Chandighar-Sukhomajri only a one-off 
contribution was made, and the hydropower companies in Himachal Pradesh make payments only on a 
compulsory, state-regulated basis. But it is found that compensation mechanisms on the catchment 
level between poor upstream communities and larger downstream beneficiaries have the greatest 
potential to develop in India (SENGUPTA ET AL. 2003). The examples of Segara River Basin in 
Indonesia and Makiling Forest Reserve in the Philippines may provide ideas of how to develop such 
schemes. However, SENGUPTA ET AL. (2003) warn of generalisations based on certain experiences. 
Whether a PWS-system works depends on the specific social, political and economic contexts of a 
watershed, and what works in one place may not be appropriate in another. 
 
The identified cases on the local level in India show how community organisations successfully 
manage funds they receive for watershed protection works and how this can contribute to poverty 
reduction. On the meso-level, we found two examples for voluntary cooperation between different 
villages in the management of their common water resources. A more detailed analysis of existing 
functioning institutions for irrigation management may offer a valuable basis for the development of 
PWS. 
 
Local level 
(intra-village mechanisms) 
Meso-level 
(inter-village mechanisms) 
Catchment-level 
(compensation mechanisms 
between small upstream 
stakeholders and larger 
downstream beneficiaries) 
 Sukhomajri Village, Haryana 
(India) 
 Adibala District, Andhra 
Pradesh (India) 
 RUPES Vietnam 
 Kuhls irrigation system, 
Himachal Pradesh (India) 
 Suan and Ropri Villages – 
Bhodi Village, Himachal 
Pradesh (India) 
 City of Chandighar – 
Sukhomajri Village, Haryana 
(India) 
 Hydropower companies as 
beneficiaries, Himachal 
Pradesh (India) 
 Segara River Basin, Indonesia 
 Master Plan for Makiling 
Forest Reserve, The 
Philippines 
Table 5: Geographic levels of PWS-related experiences in India and Asia (source: compiled by the 
author) 
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4 Conclusion 
It has been shown that a successful PWS-system depends on a significant number of requirements and 
that there is a broad spectrum of factors which may constrain its implementation. Fulfilling these 
requirements involves very high transaction costs in many cases. While some costs will arise in every 
case (e.g. an economic appraisal on supply and demand), the amount of other transaction costs 
depends on the specific local context, such as the clarity of property rights and the necessary capacity 
building among stakeholders. The biggest part of transaction costs is expected to arise for both broad 
participation and institution building, which together mark the key condition for PWS in many cases 
and the most difficult to achieve at the same time. Institutionalising public participation is a very time-
consuming and costly process, and it gets the more difficult, the more stakeholders are involved and 
the less homogeneous they are. It can be assumed that PWS will be easiest and cheapest to implement 
in a watershed, where functioning participative water management institutions already exist.  
On the other hand, PWS may also have the potential to facilitate cooperation between stakeholders for 
CPR management. This will be the case, if both potential suppliers and beneficiaries expect to 
economically benefit from such a mechanism and thus decide to cooperate for this purpose. The 
distribution of information and the intense dialogue with/among the stakeholders therefore plays a 
crucial role. Well developed methods of development planning for identifying socio-economic 
dynamics and stakeholders’ perceptions like PRA and RRA, which were refined and adapted to the 
context of PWS by JEANES ET AL. (2006)5, are highly relevant in this context (WAAGE ET AL. 2006). 
 
PWS also has the potential to benefit the rural poor – but this will only be the case, if areas of high 
poverty coincide with areas that provide valuable watershed services. Although PWS cannot primarily 
be an instrument for poverty reduction, it may contribute to this aim because in many developing 
countries, it is marginalised groups that live in upstream regions and manage lands which deliver 
watershed services. If a scheme is designed in a way that considers the livelihood strategies of poor 
households and assists them to overcome the hurdles for participating in PWS, it will have the 
potential to have positive livelihood impacts. At the same time it is important, though, to consider 
possible impacts of a PWS system on other poor groups, too. As it was pointed out, PWS may for 
example have negative impacts on landless people if they are not taken into account. A systematic 
approach is needed for being able to calculate, how different groups will be affected by a scheme. 
 
In India, where rural areas are characterised by high population density and uneven land distribution, 
PWS programmes that increase employment opportunities by stimulating the demand in agricultural 
labour are likely to have the greatest benefits for the poor (ZILBERMAN ET AL. 2006). The 
fragmentation of society along lines of caste, class and political affiliations is however a major 
constraint for implementing PWS on a watershed level in India (IIED/WINROCK INTERNATIONAL; see 
chapter 2.4). 
 
It can be concluded that the success of a PWS-scheme will basically depend on the presence of certain 
conditions and on the ability to develop the appropriate design of a programme for a specific context. 
However, if too many of the constraints that were discussed in this work are present in a watershed, 
market-like arrangements will not be likely to offer the optimal way of achieving environmental 
conservation and solving water-related conflicts.  
                                                     
5 See part II of this report for a description of  the ‘Rapid Hydrological Appraisal’ (RHA) approach. 
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